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Reflection and the Limits of Liability: Necessary
Blindness in the Legal System
ERIC LOTKE*
The legal system needs to take a good hard look at the concept of
responsibility. Whether it is crimnal guilt, products liability, or employment
discrimination, the legal system is in the business of locating responsible actors
and making them answerable for their behavior. Without a robust working
understanding of responsibility, the legal system is nothing but an arbitrary
exercise of power. Recent philosophical developments suggest a need to re-
examine responsibility as it is currently understood m the legal system.
Unfortunately, examining responsibility too closely is problematic because
our current understanding, while robust and workable, is conceptually unable
to withstand sustained scrutiny. In this essay, I investigate problems in our
understanding of responsibility and show how the legal system tolerates those
problems. The heart of my argument is that society's conception of
responsibility rests on ideas of moral autonomy that insufficiently recognize the
role of chance. We cannot solve the problems, however, sinply by increasing
our recognition of chance, because chance nullifies the requirement of control
that undergirds our understanding of responsibility. Rather, we solve the
problems by pretending they do not exist. In this essay, I briefly examine the
foundations of legal responsibility and discuss why the door to the basement is
generally left shut. A little bit of blindness is needed to make the whole system
work.
I divide the discussion into two parts. Part I provides the philosophical
framework for the analysis. In tis section, I emphasize how increasing
appreciation of the role of chance in human affairs leads to radical rethinking of
our law's idea of responsibility. The old idea of autonomous actors who freely
choose actions and intend the consequences is hopelessly inadequate.i In its
place has come a more sophisticated conception of socially constituted actors
whose intentions reflect the influence of other people and whose actions cannot
be understood independently of the world in which they occur.2 The
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The literature on the topic of autonomy is immense and growing daily. An important
early critique of this position is MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND TIE LIMrTs OF
JUSTICE (1982). Foundational theories in general are explored very carefully and rejected
one by one in BERNARD WILLIAMs, ETHICS AND THE LIMTS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985). I have
titled this essay to mimic the tradition of Williams and Sandel. See also RICHARD RORTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
2 See, e.g., DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE (1989);
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989); MICHAEL WALZER,
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intersection of these two sets of ideas yields an irreconcilable conflict between
luck and control as criteria of responsibility. The solution to the problem,
unsatisfying as it may seem, is never to hold both sets of ideas in one's head at
the same time.
In Part II, I become more specific. I examine a number of classic legal
cases in order to fill out the philosophical framework. First, I demonstrate how
luck and contingency lurk behind issues that are typically considered luck-free.
Then I detail how the legal system keeps the fortuitous components in the
background in order to prevent the ascription of responsibility from being
undermined. As long as fortuity is mitigated, requirements of control are not
jeopardized.
I have an ulterior motive, too. Regardless of the outcome of particular
arguments, I hope-simply by making the attempt-to demonstrate that certain
issues can be addressed fruitfully in terms of luck and chance. The impact of
chance tends to be so subtle that it is seldom in the limelight, yet so important
not to be disregarded completely. The time has come to move chance off the
wings and onto center stage.3
I. PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK
The crux of this essay is a joint thesis about consistency and chance. Each
facet of the thesis is a consequence of the recent shift in moral philosophy from
a foundationalist perspective to a relativistic one.4 Before discussing the
consequences, I must pause to define my terms. When I refer to a theory as
INrERPRErATIoN AND SoCIAL CRITicisM (1987); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQuALrrY (1983). For a historically oriented discussion of the
question, see DAVID McLELLAN, IDEOLOGY (1986) and CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE
SELF: THE MAKNG OFMODERN IDENTrrY (1989). For a utilitarian approach to the issue, see
BARBARA H. SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE: ALTERNATiVE PERSPECrVES FOR CRITICAL
THEORY (1988). The classic gender-ornented study is CAROL GiLLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLoGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT (1982).
3 The power of a luck-based analysis is aptly demonstrated by Martha Nussbaum's
comprehensive analysis of the treatment of luck in the classical era. MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNEs: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND
PHmOSOPHY (1986).
4 See, e.g., STEVEN D. EDWARDS, RELATIVISM, CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES AND
CATEGORICAL FRAMEWORKS (1990); RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE AND MORAL (lack Meiland &
Michael Krausz eds., 1982). The relativistic shift has made deep inroads into the legal
community, too. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and
Local SocaI Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685 (1985); Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves, 40
STAN. L. REV. 929 (1988); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: lihilism and
Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
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foundationalist, I mean it rests on universal truths or foundations that apply to
all people at all times. More precisely, these theories posit moral truths whose
truth status depends upon facts independent of human thought processes. Thus,
anybody who believes the truth of foundational truths is correct, and anybody
who denies their truth is mistaken. These theories are often termed objectivist
or universalist, and their proponents have included such major figures as Plato,
Descartes, Kant, and Mill.
In contrast, relativistic theories deny the existence of universal truths. In
one way or another, relativistic theories locate ethics in local and contingent
practices that differ from one community to another. From this perspective, the
truth of all matters is inextricably linked to the conceptual schemes of human
beings; nothing is independent of human thought processes. These points of
view are frequently labeled conventionalist or communitarian, and they include
among their proponents Richard Rorty, Michael Walzer, and Stanley Fish.
The shift from foundationalism has important consequences on both a large
and small scale. On a large scale, it means that ethical principles are socially
constructed and subject to change. Ethics becomes the science of describing
and projecting patterns of human behavior, rather than the science of
discovering pre-existing moral principles. Cultural norms, economic
conditions, interactions with foreigners, and infinitely more swirl around m an
incredibly complex and factually conditioned social stew. From this stew some
widely shared principles can be abstracted. However, the principles do not
apply to all members of a society and certainly not to all societies, nor are they
invulnerable to change. The important point is that some widely shared
principles can be extracted: Killing people is wrong (except for self-defense or
enemies in warfare), promises should be kept (unless the costs far outweigh the
benefits), and people are responsible for their own behavior (except for
coercion or duress). Ethical principles are such general behavioral norms, and
ethics is the discipline that deals with them.
On an individual scale, the shift from foundationalism to relativism forces
us to look again at personal identity. Foundationalist theories regarded
individuals as autonomous, uncaused, morally independent agents. The very
fact of humanity gave individuals a special status independent of their social
character. Yet contemporary theorists think of identity more contextually. They
see people as socially connected and mutually interdependent. Children are
raised certain ways, exposed to certain kinds of ideas, and ultimately become
certain kinds of people. Their identities down the road, and the actions they
choose, are causally related to prior circumstances over which they had no
control. Thus, in important ways their identities are products of haphazard
processes.
This paradigm shift leads to massive problems of consistency and
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coherence that have not been fully explored m either the legal or philosophical
community. If ethical principles are understood as rationally necessary or
intrinsically human, then one can reasonably expect them to be logically
consistent and perhaps even unitary. Their derivation from a single source
would cause them to hang together in a certain way. But if ethics is understood
relativistically, we have no reason to expect principles to be especially
consistent. They may mix and match in a variety of combinations.
Unfortunately, our expectations of consistency and unity have followed us into
a perspective in which they no longer apply. The results are uncomfortable.
Consider first the individual. The principle of consistency fails to respect
individual change over time or the varying imprints left by diverse
communities. If people's identities are (even partly) socially constituted, and
people are exposed to many different social contexts-one at home, one at
school, one earlier, one later-then there is no assurance that different aspects
of their identity will be consistent with each other. Different experiences will
leave differing imprints. A child may absorb a certain set of basic assumptions
in the religious home and a different set of basic assumptions in the secular
school yard. Some assumptions, like the existence or nonexistence of God, may
be so obvious and so obviously contradictory that the child will someday have
to sort them out. More subtle assumptions, like the origins of identity or
conditions of responsibility, may never be ferreted out and compared. The
child may grow up with diverse and conflicting sets of beliefs that never clash
with each other, because those facets of personality are never explicitly called
upon at the same place and the same time for the same reason. Thus, the
inconsistency may go unnoticed; people may be inconsistently constituted and
never know it.5 I suspect that even the most balanced and introspective
5 Consider, for example, people's internally inconsistent attitudes toward animals
uncovered in PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (2d ed. 1990). The book opens with an
anecdote about a woman who boasts of her love for animals while eating a ham sandwich.
Id. at Ii. Later, Singer examines the phenomenon m greater detail:
Our attitudes to animals begin to form when we are very young, and they are
dominated by the fact that we begin to eat meat at an early age. [We eat animal
flesh long before we are capable of understanding that what we are eating is the dead
body of an animal. Thus we never make a conscious, informed decision, free from the
bias that accompanies any long-established habit, reinforced by all the pressures of
social conformity, to eat animal flesh. At the same time children have a natural love of
animals, and our society encourages them to be affectionate toward animals such as
dogs and cats and toward cuddly, stuffed toy animals. These facts help to explain the
most distinctive characteristic of the attitudes of children xi our society to animals-
namely, that rather than having one unjied attitude to anmals, the child has two
conflicting attitudes that coexst, carefilly segregated so that the inherent contradicton
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individuals incorporate disparate and subtly inharmonious sets of beliefs. This
is not a claim I intend to dwell upon, but I suspect that a call for utter
consistency is a call for madness.
The same is true on a larger scale. If our ethical principles are indeed
abstracted from the chaos of real world situations and beliefs, they need not be
organizable into a single coherent scheme. They are simply stories that help us
to arrange and understand a vastly complicated world. If we push the stories
hard enough, they begin to unravel. Our moral order cannot withstand
sustained demands for consistency or coherence, because it is neither planned
nor based on inescapable laws of logic. We can see logical patterns when we
look back over the facts, but if we expect too much from the patterns, they fail
us. Our ethical beliefs are not prospectively coherent, so we should not expect
them to be retrospectively coherent either. Like figures in mk blots, they lose
their coherence when examined too closely.
Now I have reached a claim that I intend to dwell upon. The remainder of
this essay examines two principles that, considered separately, make sense.
However, if the two principles are put together and examined at the same time,
they lead to absurd results. Yet our response to the absurdity is not to reject the
principles-they are too important for that, too central to our moral
understanding. Instead, we find other ways to deal with the problem.
The first principle is the prevalence of chance. The deepest commitment of
relativistic ethics is the idea that things could be other than they are. On an
individual level, this means that people are fundamentally affected by forces
beyond their control. In this essay, I call these external forces luck, fprtune,
contingency, or chance.6 People clearly cannot control whether they are born
between them rarely causes trouble.
Id. at 213-14 (emphasis added).
Another example of socially endemic inconsistency is the old aphorism of political
science that Americans are "ideologically conservative but programmatically liberal." In
other words, Americans respond to ideological calls for free markets and minimal
government while simultaneously demanding long lists of government programs such as
food and drug testing, unemployment compensation, highway maintenance, disaster relief,
school lunches, workplace safety, and much more. For a recent exploration of this
phenomenon, see TI-oMAs FERGUSON & JOEL ROGERS, RIGHT TURN (1986). For the original
formulation, see LLOYD A. FREE & HADLEY CANrRm, THE POLITICAL BELMFS OF
AMERICANS (1967).
6 Thomas Nagel defines luck as anything beyond a person's control. See THOMAS
NAGEL, MoRTAL QuEsnoNs 26 (1979). Luck need not be beyond anybody's control, just
the agent at hand. If a pedestrian on a city street is hit by a stray bullet, the fact that
somebody caused the bullet to be fired does not imply that the effect on the individual is
anything other than fortuitous. The usage also accords with Aristotle's definition of
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black or white, rich or poor, talented or inept; but the significance of this
"natural lottery" 7 is overwhelming. Those who are born wealthy or intelligent
or into supportive families have advantages from the outset. Those who are
born poor or handicapped or into abusive families have constitutive
disadvantages that hinder achievement and may even lead them into trouble.
Fortune shapes people's genetic composition, the environment of their
childhood, and the range of opportunities available to them. It forms people's
personalities, molds their dispositions, and defines their choices of action.
None of this is under the individual's control.
Even if the constitutive circumstances are identical, chance occurrences in
the rest of the world can lead to widely different consequences. 8 Tires may or
may not go flat on the way to important appointments, and helpful people may
or may not happen by when they are needed. A person may be liable for either
homicide or assault depending on whether the victim bleeds to death before the
ambulance arrives. One person may apply for a job when it happens to be
vacant and another person when it happens to be occupied. As Mother Goose
points out, an entire kingdom can be lost for the want of a nail. 9 Much that is
involuntary action. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. The term "luck" is not
intended to be precise; it is used "generously, undefinedly, but, I think, comprehensibly."
BERNARD WLIAMS, MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, 1973-1980 at 22 (1981). In
this essay, terms like "luck," "chance," "fortuity," and "contingency" will be used
interchangeably. None of the terms are intended to connote value, as in good luck or bad
luck.
7 The term comes from Rawls. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 15, 76-80
(1971) (discussing the natural lottery and the difference principle).
8 Any emphasis on consequences is problematic, because it can be difficult to
determine what constitutes a consequence. An action may bring about certain results in the
short run, different results in the long run, and still different results in the very long run. In
the meantime, all kinds of intervening causes exert distorting effects of their own. In the
end, it becomes nnpossible to determine what the results of an action are and
correspondingly impossible to link the moral value of an action to its results. See, e.g.,
A.N. PRIOR & D.D. RAPHAEL, The Consequences of Ac'ons, in 30 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY: DREAMS AND SELF KNOWLEDE 91 (Supp. 1956).
9 MOTHER GOOSE'S NURSERY RHYMES 191 (Walter Jerrold ed., Alfred A. Knopf
Inc. 1993) (1903). The entire rhyme is as follows:
For want of a nail, the shoe was lost,
For want of the shoe, the horse was lost,
For want of the horse, the rider was lost,
For want of the rider, the battle was lost,
For want of the battle, the kingdom was lost,
And all for the want of a horse-shoe nail!
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important in life can be traced to consequential fortuities. Such contingencies
lurk everywhere and shape the context in which everything must be
understood. The sum of these fortuities, both constitutive and consequential, is
limitless. They incorporate an entire world of events beyond the agent's
control.
The second principle is that fortune relieves responsibility. Responsibility
typically rests on autonomous individuals who make their own decisions and
control their own behavior. Accidents have long been considered an
exculpatory circumstance. Aristotle expressly articulated this idea in 350 B.C.
when he said that people are not responsible for involuntary actions,10 by
which he meant anything in which the "moving principle is outside"' I the actor
or caused by circumstances beyond the actor's control. According to Aristotle,
the excuse of involuntariness extends equally to what people do and what
people are. People are excused from misdeeds done ignorantly or under
compulsion and from fundamental inadequacies of their constitutions. 12 In
general, luck relieves responsibility. There is no surer way to absolve oneself
of blame than to prove oneself a victim of circumstance.
Yet recognizing the full depth and breadth of fortuity sabotages the idea of
moral responsibility. If agents need to be in control to be responsible, and no
agent is ever fully in control, then no agent is ever fully responsible. Or to put
Id.
10 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACIHmE ETIcs, 1 15 3b1 8- 20 (David Ross trans., 1941).
Aristotle is aware of the problems implicit m unreserved recognition of chance. See id. at
bk. III, ch. 5. Aristotle explicitly excludes fortune from the heart of ethics with a bald ipse
dixit: "To entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble would be a very defective
arrangement." Id. at 1099b24.
For a general discussion of excusing conditions, see PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF
ETMCS 146-50 (1975). Any of the traditional excusing conditions-ignorance, coercion,
loss of control, or absence of ability or opportunity-can be characterized readily in terms
of chance.
I1 ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 11 l0 a2 .
12 Ignorance: The man with the catapult was excused when he "let it go off when he
merely wanted to show its working . . . ." ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 11 1 1a1 1- 12 .
Compulsion: A ship's captain may blamelessly throw goods overboard in a storm if it is
necessary to save ship and crew. Id. at 1 1 10a8- 12 . Constitution:
[While no one blames those who are ugly by nature, we blame those who are so owing
to want of exercise and care. . [No one would reproach a man blind from birth or
by disease or from a blow, but rather pity him, while everyone would blame a man who
was blind from drunkenness
Id. at 1 114 a23 -2 7 .
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it differently, if everything is ultimately caused by luck and people are not
responsible for luck, then nobody is responsible for anything. Responsibility
and voluntariness become meaningless ideas. This problem is the topic of a
famous essay by Thomas Nagel called Moral Luck.13 In this essay, Nagel
demonstrates our susceptibility to chance and examines our tendency to regard
external causes as excuses. He concludes that:
[Tihe broad range of external influences here identified seems on close
examination to undermine moral assessment as surely as does the narrower
range of familiar excusing conditions. If the condition of control is consistently
applied, it threatens to erode most of the moral assessments we find it natural
to make. The things for which people are morally judged are determined in
more ways than we at first realize by what is beyond their control. And when
the seemingly natural requirement of fault or responsibility is applied in light
of these facts, it leaves few pr-reflective moral judgements intact. Ultimately,
nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his
control. 14
On this analysis, the entire domain of moral judgment and personal agency
shrinks to an "extensionless point." 15 Choices become ethically equivalent to
accidents and people become nothing more than aggregations of external
events. 16
What then to do? The legal system obviously cannot ascribe responsibility
at random, but fully appreciating the prevalence of chance proves that ascribing
13 NAGEL, supra note 6. Nagel's book was a reworking of the essay originally
published in B.A.O. WILLIAMS & T. NAGEL, Moral Luck, 50 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AiisTOTLIAN SOcIETY 137 (Supp. 1976). Williams republished ins essay in WILLIAMS,
supra note 6. Subsequent references to moral luck will be based on Nagel's 1979 version of
his essay. Williams is an important figure in this essay too, but I use him more for his
insights into the limits of reflection than the prevalence of chance.
14 NAGEL, supra note 6, at 36.
15 Id. at 35.
16 This theory is similar to its close cousin, determinism. The (hard) determinist
argument is that people cannot be held morally responsible for actions beyond their
control-im particular, actions performed under compulsion or without choice. Yet every
event in the umverse is predestined to occur and cannot be altered; every event is either
planned by a umversal consciousness or is an inevitable link in a chain of cause and effect
extending indefinitely to both the past and future. Because people do not freely choose their
actions, and also because people cannot be accountable for actions not freely chosen, they
cannot be held accountable for anything. For excerpts from classic statements of
determinism, see, for example, INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN ETHcS 275-94 (William T.
Frankena & John K. Granrose eds., 1974) and INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN PHILOsOPHY
91-107 (Robert R. Ammerman & Marcus G. Singer eds., 1960).
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responsibility to agents and actions is deeply arbitrary. Everything that people
appear to be directly responsible for is actually a consequence of distant
coincidences. There are three ways to deal with this problem. Two potential
answers to the question will quickly be considered and dismissed. The third
answer, which I believe is correct, will then be developed at length.
The first potential answer to the question is to dismiss it by separating
moral responsibility from legal responsibility. One can argue that contingency
destroys moral responsibility but leaves legal liability unscathed. Even if
chance were freely acknowledged in all its forms, and the entire field of moral
responsibility were undermined, only moral aspects of the law would be
affected. Regulatory or utilitarian aspects would not be affected. Thus, for
instance, the moral force of criminal sanctions would decline but the deterrent
force would remain unchanged. If moral luck truly undermined moral
responsibility, then the legal response to moral luck would be just as dismissive
as the response to determinism. 17 As a practical matter, people must be held
legally liable-even if they are not responsible in a deep mora sense.
This answer will not be adopted here. It is too simplistic and it overloads
the difference between moral and legal responsibility. 18 Both systems
ultimately require attributions of responsibility to make sense-even if the type
and consequences of responsibility differ. Simply classifying parties as
plaintiffs and defendants implies an attribution of responsibility Each party is
linked to and identified with a closed set of behaviors or characteristics.
17 The law traditionally rebuffs determinist attempts to undermine responsibility.
"IThe law has been guided by a robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the
will as a workng hypothesis in the solution of its problems." Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1936); see also Monssette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250
n.4 (1951); State v. Macias, 131 P.2d 810, 811-12 (Ariz. 1942).
For an expression of social determinism and an argument for its applicability to
criminal law, see CLARENCE DARRow, CPME AND CRM]NALS: AN ADDRESS DELIVERED TO
THE PRISONRS IN THE CHICAGO COuNTY JAIL (1902). Clarence Darrow is rumored to once
have argued that his client should not be punished for a crine, because his client was fated
to act as he did and the action was therefore ivoluntary. The judge replied that Darrow
may be right, and if so, then it was also fated that the defendant be sentenced to prison. The
judge had no choice m the matter.
18 The argument, however, does raise significant and perplexing questions about the
gap between legal and moral responsibility. Legal liability need not correspond perfectly
with moral responsibility, but it cannot be too different either: "All legal systems m
response either to tradition or to social needs both extend responsibility and cut it off in
ways which diverge from the simpler principles of moral blame." H.L.A. HART & TONY
HONORP, CAusATioN iN TnE LAW 67 (2d ed. 1985). For a discussion of related issues, see,
for example, JoEL FlINBERG, Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals, in DOING AND
DESERVING (1970) and O.W. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARv L. REV. 457 (1897).
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A second possible answer is to reject the premise that people are never
morally responsible for luck. One can argue that fortune absolves responsibility
only in certain circumstances but not in all of them. People are responsible for
deeper circumstances but not shallow ones. People are not morally responsible
for the shallow fortuity of an accidentally broken vase, but they are morally
responsible for freely chosen actions-even if the actions ultimately rest on
deeply hidden fortuities of birth or personality. Seen in this way, the problem
of line drawing becomes one of deciding how deep to dig. At some point, one
can no longer regard fortuity as an excuse; one must take responsibility for
oneself.
Though appealing, this answer also will not be adopted here. It treats
moral agency too haphazardly and fails to appreciate how deeply Nagel's ideas
contradict the classical paradigm of responsibility. The classical concept of
moral agency rests on an uncaused, uncontingent, morally independent self. In
contrast, the theory of moral luck insists that identities are causally shaped by
contingencies. These two definitions of the self cannot be reconciled.' 9 If there
is no central core of identity, then the classical concept of moral agency either
must be rejected or radically redefined. The compromise solution above does
neither and is therefore unsatisfactory. If a person is to be considered a morally
responsible agent under the classical paradigm, then the agency must be more
than skin deep. It must go all the way to the bone.
The third answer, on which I will elaborate in the following section, is to
cheat. As Nagel remarks in his essay, when one stops attending to the subtler
aspects of luck, they tend to disappear 20 and one returns to the simple "pre-
19 Needless to say, not everybody agrees with this claim. There have been many
thoughtful attempts to define autonomy in ways that avoid these problems. The central
contemporary work is Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a
Person, 68 1. Pim. 5 (1971). Frankfurt's idea is to hierarchize people into (at least) two
levels: The first level consists of what people want, and the second level is what they want
to want. Freedom consists in getting the first layer to act in accordance with the second
layer. Gary Watson borrows the idea of herarchization but separates beliefs from values
and argues that freedom consists in getting the motivational system to act in accordance with
the valuational system. Gary Watson, Free Agency, 72 J. PHiL. 205 (1975). However, these
theories, and others like them, fail to consider the sources of values or higher level desires.
If the top of the hierarchy is not freely determined, for example, if it is socially contingent,
then action in conformity with it seems a cramped definition of freedom. As John Christman
says, "[A] person cannot be autonomous at a lower level of desire when those very desires
are the result of manipulation further up the hierarchy of preferences." John Chnstman,
Introduction to THE INNER CrrADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIivDUAL AtrroNoMY 3, 9 (John
Christman ed., 1989).
20 NAGEL, supra note 6, at 35.
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reflective"21 state in which fortune absolves moral responsibility. Nagel also
observes that moral luck, like other skeptical theories, does not arise from
overly strict premises but from the consistent application of ordinary ones. 22 In
this case, the premise is that people are not responsible for chance events, and
the problem arises from applying the premise to an ever widening sphere of
chance. However, Nagel's remark implies that skeptical conclusions may be
averted without dismissing the premise altogether, simply by applying the
premise inconsistently.
The fundamental reasoning is simple. If consistent application of the
premise undermines responsibility, but the concept of responsibility cannot be
undermined, then the premise should be applied inconsistently. In other words,
the premise that people are not responsible for luck is retained but selectively
invoked. Of course, this is not done in an organized manner by a central
agency. When I say the legal system does this or that, I do not mean to suggest
that an invisible chieftain is making executive decisions. Rather, I am referring
to the way many of us think and the way the system, and all the participants in
it, are conditioned to deal with the world. As a society, we collectively delude
ourselves by masking certain principles at certain times in order to avoid
confusing results.
Consider, for example, how we would describe a murder committed by
somebody who lived a horribly violent childhood and subsequently developed a
hostile and aggressive adult disposition. We do not say, "He is responsible for
pulling the trigger and he is responsible for having a murderous disposition,
and he is responsible for having been raised in a violent home." We do not use
the term responsibility equivalently in all those contexts. Conversely, we do not
say, "It was fortuitous that he pulled the trigger and fortuitous that he was
raised in a violent home." That is not how we use the term fortuity. What we
say is: "It was fortuitous that he was raised in a violent home, but he is
responsible for choosing to kill." We do not question how responsibility can sit
atop fortuity-because as we understand responsibility, it cannot.
There is no algorithm, even in principle, for determining when
contingencies will be acknowledged and when they will not. The tension
between the requirement of voluntariness and the depth of contingency is real.
It cannot be made to go away. It is a fundamental incoherence at the heart of
ethics, and it is resolved only by not being recognized.
By advancing this thesis, I am following the lead of philosopher Bernard
Williams, who suggests that there are limits to what can be known by
philosophical reflection, and that sustained questioning destroys moral
21 Id. at 26.
22 Id. at 27.
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certainty. 23 His argument reverses the classical position that reflection is the
path to certainty. Williams particularly doubts whether the institution of
blaming could "survive a clear understanding of how it works." 24 This doubt
suggests that if the institution is to survive, then it may rely on a certain
amount of ignorance or obfuscation. 25 Such effects can be achieved by
selectively invoking premises. The question then progresses to how and where
the selection takes place.
II. SAYiNG ONE THING AND MEANING ANOTHER: THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN LEGAL LABILITY AND LUCK
The aim of this part of the essay is to see how the law preserves the
institution of blaming by selectively invoking the premise that people are not
responsible for luck. On its face, the legal system adopts the premise that
people are not liable26 for luck. If too many factors are found to be beyond a
party's control, then liability is not imposed. In tort law, for example, accidents
are generally not compensable, 27 and doctrines like proximate cause establish
liability by separating events for which an agent is causally responsible from
events that are too dominated by fortuity.28 Moreover, liability may be
decreased by contributions from circumstances that the defendant cannot
control, such as negligence by the plaintiff or intervening causes. The pattern is
followed in both criminal law and contract law, where factors beyond the
agent's control may act as mitigating circumstances or excuses to breach.
Exceptions like strict liability contravene the general principle of not holding
people responsible for luck, and hence, they often seem unfair despite their
23 See WLLIAMS, supra note 6, at 148, 171, 193-94. My position is a cousin of Jerry
Frug's claim that legal argument is significantly rhetorical rather than logical. According to
Frug, the character of an argument is at least as important as its logic and its premises.
Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869 (1988).
24 WILLAMS supra note 6, at 193-94.
25 Plato, the exemplar of philosophical reflection, was sensitive to these concerns. One
of the most puzzling parts of the Republic is the noble or necessary lie. The lie is that
people are born with different talents according to a plan or design, not purely at random.
Socrates suggests that such a lie is essential to the successful functioning of a society.
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 389b, 414c-16c (Paul Shorey trans., 1982).
26 The term "liability" is used only for responsibility m a legal context. The term
"responsibility" is used to denote moral and legal responsibility in general or moral
responsibility m particular. When the distinction is important, the words "moral" or "legal"
will be appropriately prefixed to highlight the difference.27 See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
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practical justifications.29 Thus, the law generally accepts the simple, intuitive
notion that people are not liable for luck.30
Nonetheless, accepting the premise does not require the law to apply it.
Fortune may be selectively invoked to meet the demands of a given situation. 31
Consider the case of Kuhlmann v. Wilson.32 In Kuzlmann, the police placed an
undercover informant in a defendant's prison cell where, after a while, the
defendant freely elected to speak with him. The defendant incriminated himself
and the statement was admitted at trial. The Supreme Court held that admitting
the defendant's statement did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. The Court reasoned that the statement was not obtained by
state action, but by mere "luck or happenstance." 33 The Court acted as if the
defendant just happened to choose to speak, and more importantly, that the
State just happened to overhear. Emphasizing the fortuity of the statement's
acquisition enabled the Court to admit it, because the State obviously could not
be barred from using information that simply fell from the sky. Yet the Court
ignored the fact that the police deliberately placed the informant in the cell with
the express intent of acquiring information. By shifting attention to the
fortuitous components of the event, the Court reduced the event to legal
29 See infra text accompanying notes 57-70.
30 For a discussion of how the law treats fortune, see the following: 3 JAMES F
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIM]NAL LAW OF ENGLAND 310-12 (1983); Tony Honor6,
Responsibility and Luck The Moral Basis of St'ct Liability, 104 LAw Q. REv 530 (1988);
Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preevisting ConMons and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); Mark S.Mandell & Susan M. Carlin, The Value of a Chance: The Evolution and Direction of
Chance in Tort Law, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 203 (1986); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and
Punishment: A ritique of Emphasis on the Result of Conduct in the Cnrminal Law, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974); Yora M. Shachar, The Fortuitous Gap in Law and Morality, 6
CraiM. JuST. ETmics 12 (1987); J.C. Smith, The Element of Chance in Cnrmnal Liability,
1971 CRiM. L. REv. 63; Daniel M. Mandil, Note, Chance, Freedom, and Cnrnunal
Liability, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 125 (1987).3 1 Note, The Luck of the Law: Allusions to Fortuity in Legal Discourse, 102 HARv. L.
REv. 1862 (1989). The Note contends that once something is identified as luck, it becomes
legally irrelevant. The claim is frequently but not always true-sometimes, as m accidents,
luck is the most relevant feature m the lawsuit. Even where luck is not explicitly relevant, it
is implicit in concepts that are relevant, such as foreseeability.
32 477 U.S. 436 (1986). This discussion stems from the Note, supra note 31, where it
and related examples are discussed more fully.
33 477 U.S. at 459 (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) (citing
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 276 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring))). In Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985), the situation was identical except the informant actively
questioned the defendant. The statements were not admitted because they were said to be
obtained by state action and not by luck. Ld. at 176-77.
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insignificance.
This shifting of attention exemplifies the legal solution to problems of
responsibility. The law calls attention to fortuity only when it is useful. The
law manipulates the premise that parties are not responsible for luck by
selectively recognizing luck. When luck is not useful it may be left to disappear
on the sidelines. Once luck is obscured, the premise that luck relieves liability
is rendered irrelevant. Thus, the law imposes liability by drawing lines between
luck that is, and is not, recognized. Unrecognized fortune is treated as if it
were not fortune at all. This is the mechanism used to preserve the coherence
of the practice of imposing liability. The law selectively invokes the premise
that luck relieves liability by alternately recognizing or concealing the presence
of fortuity. This process is necessary because if fortuity were consistently
recognized then the incoherence would surface and nobody could ever be held
responsible for anything.34
The following sections are devoted to tracing the recognition and
concealment of fortuity in the legal system. These sections are not devoted to
determining when or why people are held liable, but only to discussing the
mechanisms for revealing the decision. The discussion is divided into three
parts, corresponding to the three ways the law treats liability and luck. The first
two methods relate to the imposition of liability. In the first method, the
presence of luck is concealed-certain things that are luck are treated as if they
are not luck-and then liability is imposed. In the second method, the presence
of luck is openly recognized, but liability is imposed anyway. These two
options, recognition and concealment of chance, exhaust the possible stances
towards recognition of chance when liability is imposed. If neither of these two
options is taken, then there remains the third, default option of not imposing
liability. Each of these three options will now be examined in turn.
A. Method One. Concealing Luck
The first way to impose liability is to conceal luck by shifting attention to
events that reasonably can be characterized as something else. This is desirable
because it imposes liability when needed and also maintains the appearance of
fairness by adopting the premise that luck relieves people of liability In this
scenario, the law must decide when to recognize fortuitous circumstances and
when not to recognize them. When liability is needed the event is called, for
34 As an inconsistency it is far deeper than the selective invocations of maxims and
counter maxims detailed in KARL LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADroN: DECIDiNG
APPEALS 521-35 (1966). This is not a case of selecting rules m order to defend a coherent
belief. In this case the belief itself is incoherent.
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instance, intentional or caused. When liability is not needed the event is
dismissed as chance.
Thus, the law characterizes the line that separates recognized and
unrecognized fortune as if it separated luck and nonluck. The law labels one
side of the line as fortune and the opposite side as, for instance, causation or
intent. But in fact, the line does not divide fortune from causation or intent; the
line divides luck from itself. It is simply a line between luck that is more or
less obvious, and the only difference is legal recognition. Significantly, luck is
rarely mentioned during the analysis. The discussion typically occurs in terms
of luck's supposed opposite: Courts ask whether the defendant caused the
harm, they do not ask whether the harm stemmed from luck.
Some examples will help to make the argument more concrete. Lines of
this kind are drawn in many places, but perhaps nowhere so manifestly as m
the tort doctrine of proximate cause. Here the line is drawn case by case m
order to determine whether or not a particular outcome was reasonably
foreseeable. 35 Yet foreseeability can be characterized as a matter of chance. In
terms of chance, the question becomes how much of the outcome resulted from
the defendant's action and how much resulted from random unexpected
contributions of the outside world. Foreseeable risks can be prevented and
therefore controlled. Unforeseeable risks are by definition ungovernable.
Proximate cause establishes liability by determining whether the harm was
caused by the defendant or by unforeseeable circumstances that the defendant
could not control.
In Petition of Kinsman Transit Co. ,36 literally a textbook case,3 7 a ship was
negligently secured to a negligently maintained pier on a stormy evening.38 The
ship broke loose from its moorings and careened down the river, striking two
other ships and tearing one of them loose from its moorings. 39 The two stray
ships then collided into a negligently lowered drawbridge, destroying it and
clogging the narrow river with wreckage so badly that property for miles
upstream was damaged by flooding.40
The issue was how much of the resulting damage was caused by the
defendants, 41 and how much was caused by unforeseeable circumstances. 42 The
35 W. PAGE KEETON rr AL., PROSSER AND KE.TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 273
(Sth ed. 1984).
36 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dented, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
37 See, e.g., JAMES HENDERSON & ICHARD PEARSON, THE TORTS PROcESS 562 (3d
ed. 1989).
38 338 F.2d at 712-13.
39 Id. at 712.
40 Id. at 712-13.
41 The owners of the first ship, the pier, and the city that controlled the bridge
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majority of the court held the defendants liable for all of the harm, but noted
that all careless actors will not always be held liable for all the harm they
cause.43 "Somewhere a point will be reached when courts will agree that the
link has become too tenuous-that what is claimed to be consequence is only
fortuity." 44 The dissent agreed with the majority's analysis, but wanted to draw
the line elsewhere.45 The dissent believed liability should not include damage
done by the flood, because there was too great a causal distance between the
negligence and the flooding.46 Too many fortuitous factors, like the rising
water level and the addition of the second ship, contributed to the harm to hold
the defendants liable for all the damage. The dissent argued that the defendants
should not be liable for damage caused by circumstances that so far exceeded
their control.47
I am going to analyze this case three times in three different ways, each of
which is intended to highlight a different way chance is involved in the
situation and how the law treats it. The first and second analyses, the models of
the inverse proportion and the infinite chain of causation, are similar. They
ignore the actors themselves and explore the general context m which the
incident occurs. The third analysis, based on human standards, focuses on the
actors and examines the role of fortune in a personal context. The third analysis
will then be augmented with a similar exploration of mens rea in criminal law.
All of these analyses emphasize facts that are typically dismissed as irrelevant.
Yet relevance is exactly what is at issue. From a more global, contextual
perspective, these facts are critical and the legally significant facts are mere
details.
The first analysis, based on a model of an inverse proportion, was
implicitly adopted by the court in Kinsman Transit. Both the majority and
dissent acted as if causality and fortuity are inversely proportional, as if
causality increases as luck decreases and vice versa. Events like the first ship
strildng the second ship are causally close to the initial negligence; there is little
contribution from fortuity. Events like the flooding are causally distant from
the initial negligence; there is considerable contribution from fortuity. From
this perspective, a court's job is to find the right place on the spectrum to draw
the line. Liability is not imposed when the defendant's causal contribution to
the harm becomes too small and the fortuitous factors become too large. At that
were all joined as defendants. Id. at 713.42 Id. at 721.
43 Id. at 725-26.
44Id. at 725.
45 Id. at 728.
4 Id.
47 Id.
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point, the law declines to assert causality and begins to ascribe luck.
The model of the inverse proportion is convenient but not compelling. It
rests on an artificial distinction between fortuity and causality The entire
situation in Knsman Transit can be portrayed as an unfortunate aggregation of
fortuitous circumstances. The inverse proportion between causality and luck
can readily be replaced by a model based on luck alone. Because every cause
rests on contingency, everything the model characterizes as caused can be
recharacterized as a product of factors beyond the defendants' control. The
defendants did not cause the second ship to be placed where it was available to
be hit by the first ship, nor did they cause the property that was flooded to be
located by the riverfront. They did not cause the storm, the narrowness of the
river, or the negligence of the other defendants. But if any factor had been
missing, the event would not have occurred, or it would not have been so bad.
Thus, the damage was not caused simply by the defendants, but by the chance
conglomeration of all the circumstances, from bad weather to personal
incompetence. When a court states that a defendant caused a harm, it masks the
fortuities that support the cause.
These fortuities are legally irrelevant but are not nonexistent. They provide
the setting in which the tort occurs and are utterly essential to its occurrence.
The context makes the tort. The difference between negligence and mere
carelessness typically hinges on factors the actor cannot control. If the pier had
not been poorly maintained then the ship would not have broken free, and the
ship's captain would have been merely careless. But the pier was poorly
maintained, and the ship did break away, so the captain became legally
negligent. The law's focus on actors obscures the unportance of the setting in
which they act. Actors who make identical mistakes m nonidentical situations
may produce tragically different results. One actor may frequently make
mistakes but never cause a harm. Another actor may make mistakes rarely, but
make one at exactly the wrong time and be liable for a tort. That is chance. For
carelessness to rise to negligence there must be, at the very least, a plaintiff
available to be harmed. In the famous case of Byrne v. Boadle,48 for instance,
if a pedestrian had not happened to be standing under the window when the
barrel of flour rolled out, there would have been a mess, but no tort.49 Thus,
the difference between liability and nonliability is largely a matter of factors
beyond the defendant's control; it is not, as the law claims, simply a matter of
what the defendant causes. Nothing is ever caused in the pure sense, although
the law acts as if it is. Most factors contributing to the harm are matters of
chance.
48 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
49 Id. An analogous fortuity m crimmal law is getting caught. Unless the defendant has
the bad luck to be caught-and many people never are-criminal law never applies.
1993] 1441
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The law eliminates such contextual fortuities with the practical and
expedient "but for" rule of causation. This rule holds that a defendant causes
an event if the event would not have occurred but for the defendant's action.50
William Prosser admits that an "event without millions of causes is simply
inconceivable" and endorses the "but for" rule to isolate the legally relevant
cause.51 The rule thus focuses attention on the actor and excludes the context.
However, the rule is misleading because the role of chance in creating the tort
vastly overbalances the role of the defendant. The choice of one cause-the
defendant as the bearer of liability-is profoundly arbitrary. The law seeks to
protect plaintiffs from harm they did not cause. Yet to do so imposes harm on
defendants for circumstances they did not cause. The rule of "but for"
causation is thus a double-edged sword. On one hand, the context would not
have caused the harm but for the action of defendant; on the other hand, the
action of the defendant would not have caused the harm but for the context; on
one hand, the plaintiff would not be hurt but for the conduct of the defendant;
on the other hand, the defendant would not be liable but for the presence of the
plaintiff. In a deep sense, harm suffered by the plaintiff is no more arbitrary
than the harm suffered by the defendant. The "but for" rule obscures all of
this. Two swift syllables condemn most of the world to Irrelevance. The law
grasps the surface phenomenon and acts as if the rest does not exist.
The law conceals the importance of chance by using the language of
causation. Courts typically speak in terms of causes-the term "proximate
cause" is an example-without recognizing that causes themselves rest on
fortuities. If the defendant is found liable then the causes are trumpeted and the
fortuities are ignored. This selection renders irrelevant the premise that luck
relieves responsibility. But if the defendant is not found liable, then the
language shifts and fortuitous factors are brought into the open. This selection
renders the premise determinative. The point established by the doctrine of
proximate cause can be described as the place where the law changes from the
language of causality to the language of luck. Until that point, fortuitous factors
are largely ignored.
A second model of the situation characterizes the consequences of an action
as an infinite chain.52 Justice Andrews expressed this view m his dissent to the
famous case, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.5 3 According to this view,
every act sets off a chain of consequences that extends infinitely outward. As
Andrews said, "A boy throws a stone into a pond. The ripples spread. The
5 0 K oN LT AL., supra note 35, § 41, at 266.
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., HART & HONORA, supra note 18, at 68-73, 100; see also PRIOR &
RAPHAEL, supra note 8.
53 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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water level rises. The history of that pond is altered to all eternity " 54 The
effect of the act never ends, it simply becomes more and more faint. The law's
task is to decide where on the infinite chain to stop imposing liability.
The chain of consequences that resulted from the negligence m Kinsman
Transit included striling the second ship, destroying the bridge, and flooding
the land. For these results the defendants were held liable. The consequences
might also include, hypothetically, a commuter who was delayed by the
destruction of the bridge, a deal that failed as a result of delay, and a company
that floundered as a result of the failure. For these results the defendants would
not be liable. The question answered by proximate cause is where to cut off the
chain of causation that extends outward toward infinity.
However, the infinite chain of consequences could easily be reversed.
Instead of a chain of consequence extending outward toward infinity, the
situation can be portrayed as an infinite chain of fortuity extending right up to
the event. In the hypothetical scenario, the chain of fortuity would include the
commuter who needed the bridge, the deal about to be closed, and the company
that relied on the deal. The defendants controlled none of these incidental
effects. A court would recognize them as fortuities and not impose liability.
More importantly, the actual chain of fortuity in Kinsman Transit included, for
instance, the location of the second ship, the structural strength of the bridge,
and the river's propensity to flood. These fortuities were not recognized. They
did not relieve liability even though they were beyond the defendants' control,
and even though the tort would not have occurred without them. They were
beyond the point at which fortuity was considered an issue and within the range
where causality was the concept of choice. Thus, they were deemed irrelevant.
Proximate cause can therefore be seen as the doctrine that decides where to
stop recognizing the chain of fortuity that extends right up to the event.
None of this is intended to indict the doctrine of proximate cause, but
simply to describe it. Proximate cause is needed to determine when liability
should be imposed, and it provides the mechanism for balancing considerations
such as public policy, legal expedience, and "practical politics." 55
54 Id. at 103 (Andrews, j., dissenting).
5 5 Id. See also KETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 41, at 264:
As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so
closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in
imposmg liability. Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any
act, upon the basis of some social idea ofjustice or policy.
Id.
See also HART & HONoRiz, supra note 18, at 90. Boundaries on liability for
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Traditionally, proximate cause is described as a matter of foreseeability.
However, it can also be portrayed as a matter of acknowledging or concealing
fortuity. It can be characterized as a debate over when luck will, or will not, be
relevant. Because a widely shared belief demands that people not be held liable
for luck, the label "luck" must be applied only when people are not held liable.
When people are held liable, the label "luck" must not be applied. Labeling
events as causal, although they are deeply fortuitous, serves this legal purpose.
It makes things manageable and preserves the coherence of imposing liability.
The third analysis of Kinsman Transit starts from the point of view of
personal abilities and the standards against which people are measured. This
analysis probes deeper than the other two. It does not focus on the fortuities of
the situation, but the fortuities of the actors. It treats personal qualities in an
unusual and disquieting way-as aggregations of chance circumstances.
From this perspective, the most important cause of harm was the critical
actors' lack of foresight. The actors did not anticipate and forestall misfortune
before it occurred, as reasonable people would have done. That is why they are
said to have caused the harm. Yet this cause rests on fortuity too. The actors'
inability to meet the reasonable person standard was fortuitous, as was the
placement of just these actors in just this situation. The defendants' lack of
foresight could be due to any number of unappreciated fortuitous factors, both
constitutive and consequential. In Kinsman Transit, perhaps the worker who
inspected the pier performed poorly because she happened to have the flu.
Perhaps the ship's captain was a capable novice who would not have made a
mistake if such extraordinary circumstances had not occurred. Perhaps the
person who should have raised the bridge was trained all his life not to deviate
from the prescribed path and did not want to risk an act of initiative. The point
here is not to make excuses, but to highlight the role of chance in creating the
disaster. Negligent actors are negligent for a reason, and that reason typically
lies beyond the actors' control. It is likely to be a personal .quality rooted in the
individual's past and shaped by contingencies of upbringing, education, or
genetic composition. Furthermore, fortuitous personal inadequacies may only
be exposed if a demanding situation happens to arise. Simply saying the actors
caused the harm obscures these deeper functions of fortuity. Like proximate
cause, it focuses attention on one aspect, which is considered a cause, and veils
the fortuities that underlie the cause.
This veil is implicitly contained in the legal standards against which people
are measured. As a rule, everybody is measured against the same standard-the
consequences of negligence "are questions of the law's policy, to be found m the court's
conception of what limitations are just and expedient or m accord with the rationale or
'purpose' of legal rules." Id.
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average reasonable person.56 Such a uniform standard disregards fortuitous
differences in the qualities of the individual. As Justice Holmes said, "[The
law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and
education which make the internal character of a given act so different in
different men." 57 Here again, the rule is soundly based m public policy, which
is set forth convincingly by Justice Holmes. 58 And here again, the decision to
disregard fortuity is illustrated by the labels used. The law says the harm was
caused by lack of foresight. The law does not search one level deeper and say
the harm was caused by a fortuitous mismatch between the fortuitously
acquired abilities of the individual and the fortuitously determined demands of
the situation. The role of luck is thereby concealed.
Such camouflage is necessary because measuring people against standards
that they are congenitally unable to meet may seem unfair. It violates the
tendency to excuse people for circumstances over which they have no control.
Occasionally, however, the law accommodates this sympathy by adjusting the
standard to the peculiarities of an individual or a class of individuals. For
example, children are judged against standards that are proportional to their
age, and the law even recognizes individual differences between children of the
same age.59 People with formally recognized physical disabilities are also
measured against different standards. These exceptions represent an admission
that people are shaped by contingencies such as genetic composition, that they
are not entirely in control of their personal qualities, and that these
considerations should affect their liability. But the law cannot afford to go too
far in that direction. The law cannot consider people fundamentally shaped by
contingencies unless it abandons the idea of morally responsible agents, which
it is unwilling to do. Thus, most individual differences must be ignored.
In sum, focusing on the negligence of the actor obscures a great deal of
fortuity because standards of foreseeability conceal the fortuities that comprise
the individual. Lowered standards reveal an attempt to match the law with
constitutive fortuities. Objective standards represent a legal decision to ignore
those fortuities, which makes people liable for chance variations in ability
When deciding which standard to use, the law implicitly decides whether or not
constitutive fortuities are legally relevant. In making this decision, there is a
three-way tension among the ease and simplicity of objective standards, the
desire to adjust standards to individual abilities, and a limit as to how far the
law can admit that people are shaped in such fundamental ways by fortuities.
A similar suppression occurs in evaluating mens rea in criminal law. Here
5 6 KEEToN Er AL., supra note 35, § 32, at 173-74.
5 7 OLIVERW. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881).
5 8 Id.
59 KEErON ET AL., supra note 35, § 32, at 179.
199:31 1445
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
issues of agency come forward where they can be seen most plainly. In
general, courts consider individuals to be utterly in control of their mental
states. Fortuitous factors in the composition of the defendant's mental state are
considered irrelevant, despite their importance. Exceptions are sometimes made
for narrowly defined factors that affect the degree of the charge or defenses,
such as insanity, and luck may be discussed to some extent in these situations.
But criminal law predominantly focuses on intentions, and even intentional
actions rest on fortuities. These fortuities cannot be recognized.
Consider, for example, an intentional homicide. Underneath the intention
hides a world of fortuity. People may murder others only because a certain set
of circumstances happens to develop. If the circumstances do not all come
together in the necessary way, the murder may not take place. Perhaps the
defendant had the bad luck to be raised in a violent household and became
accustomed to solving problems by force. Perhaps lately there had been a rash
of armed robberies in the neighborhood, so the defendant decided to buy a gun.
Perhaps the defendant had just been unfairly fired from work and was
frustrated and under financial strain. Perhaps the defendant and victim have
long disliked each other and generally try to avoid each other, but on this day
they happened to be in the same place at the same time. If all these components
come together, a murder results. If one component is excluded, the intent may
not have formed or been carried out.60
These conditions are irrelevant in determining whether the defendant
should be punished. Only mens rea, not its causes, is considered. With a few
exceptions like self-defense, it is only important that the action was chosen, not
why the action was chosen. Choice is considered to be a fundamental category.
The law does not look to see what lurks behind choices. Freely chosen actions
are considered to be the paradigm of self-control and are therefore indisputable
recipients of praise or blame. As Sanford Kadish says, it is impossible to admit
as a "defense to crimes of intention that the defendant couldn't help choosing to
act as he did because that's the kind of person he is-aggressive, self-centered,
brutal and so on[.]" 61 Kadish explains that this defense would "undermine the
practice of blaming altogether, in common moral discourse as well as in
law." 62 He is exactly right. Revealing the full impact of fortuity has alarming
consequences. But, we cannot therefore conclude that fortuity does not have
60 Joel Femberg presents a similar example in whIch consequential luck prevents the
murder from taking place. In the example, a dust speck lands on the would-be murderer's
nose just as he starts to "bum with rage." As a result of a subsequent sneezing fit, the
intention to commit the murder never forms. FEInBERG, supra note 18, at 35.
61 SANFoRD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAw 97
(1987).
62Id.
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such a large impact. We can only conclude that there are certain advantages to
covering it up. Thus, the law draws a line in which factors that are ultimately
beyond the defendant's control are not considered exculpatory-or even
relevant. As in proximate cause, the law looks only a certain distance down a
causal chain, and then it stops.63
Recently there has been some movement towards acknowledging the
impact of fortune in such contexts. For instance, in nonjail alternative
sentencing, the factors that underlie the freely chosen action may be
considered. Judges may design sentences to remedy contingencies of education
or upbringing, or personality traits such as addiction. Moreover, Catharine
MacKinnon discusses deeply underlying contingencies in her response to Mary
Daly's analysis of suttee, an Indian practice in which widows immolate
themselves upon their dead husband's funeral pyres in grief.64 Daly complains
that Indian women are often drugged, browbeaten, or simply pushed into the
fire. Probing further, MacKinnon complains that the "deepest victims" of
suttee are the women who freely choose to kill themselves because they have
been socially conditioned to prefer it.65 That too is compulsion, but of a
deeper, more insidious sort. Yet exposing how supposedly free choices are
forged by external factors opens the door to excuses of the kind Kadish
envisions. The law cannot go too far in that direction. Recognmzing that
intentional murders or freely chosen suttees are not truly free exposes the
imposition of liability to skeptical doubts.
To summarize, legal doctrines conceal a great deal of luck by treating it as
if it were not luck. This compromise simultaneously satisfies the legal need for
liability and the social inclination not to hold people responsible for
circumstances beyond their control. More importantly, it preserves the myth
that people are autonomous, fully independent agents. Proximate cause masks
fortuity as causality; objective standards disregard fortuitous variations in
ability; and mens rea virtually denies fortuity's existence. Fortuity plays a
dominant role in all these cases, yet it is hidden to advance legal ends.
63 One way to view the issue is to focus on the size of the relevant time frame.
Differing appraisals of criminality can be reached depending on whether one looks purely at
the incident itself or the history leading up to the incident. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Stnct
Liability: An Unorthodox Vew, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUsTICE 1512, 1516
(Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
64 Catharne A. MacKinnon, Fenunsm, Maxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda
for Theory, in 7 SIGNS 538-39 n.56 (1982).
65 Id.
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B. Method Two: Acknowledging Luck But Imposing Responsibility
Anyway
Sometimes the law openly acknowledges the presence of luck but holds the
defendant liable anyway. In these cases the law simply overrules the premise
that luck relieves responsibility, rather than making the premise appear
irrelevant as the method above did. This approach is uncommon because it
contravenes the general sentiment that people are not responsible for luck. The
outcome often appears unfair, because it creates a mismatch between moral and
legal responsibility: People are perceived to be morally innocent but legally
liable. However, the approach is justified on policy grounds, such as the
overbalancing of small injustices to individuals by larger social interests.
The most obvious example of this approach is strict liability. In torts or
crimes for which a defendant is strictly liable, ill fortune is never an excuse.66
Liability attaches even if the harm were caused by factors the defendant could
not control. Classic instances of strict liability include hazardous activities,
manufactured products, and public welfare offenses. 67
For example, in the seminal tort case, Rylands v. Fletcher,68 the defendant
was held strictly liable for flood damage when water escaped from his
reservoir. 69 The water escaped through a defect m the subsoil that the
defendant neither knew of nor caused, and that was completely beyond his
control.70 The court found him free from all blame, yet imposed liability
anyway. 71 The court reasoned that the defendant had chosen to collect the
water on his land, thus creating a potentially hazardous condition.72
Consequently, he assumed the risk of its escape for any reason.
Attempts to justify strict liability tend to focus on two grounds. 73 First, as
the Rylands court stressed, 74 strict liability is morally acceptable because the
defendant chose to engage in the activity, and the defendant is being held liable
for that choice. Second, a harsh rule is needed to protect individuals
jeopardized by the activity.
66 KEETONET AL., supra note 35, § 75, at 536.
67 Id. § 78, at 545-59, § 98, at 692-94; Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens
Rea: 1ll-The Rise and Fall of Stnct Omunal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REv. 337 (1989).
68 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
69 Id. at 337-40.
70 Id. at 337-38.
71 Id. at 339-40.
72 1d.
73 E.g., KEETONLET AL., supra note 35, § 75, at 537.
74 Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, 339-40 (H.L. 1868).
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Despite these justifications, strict liability is often derided as unfair.75
People are uncomfortable with the idea of imposing liability for harm that was
not caused by the defendant, but by circumstances beyond the defendant's
control. Yet from the standpoint of moral luck, strict liability is no more or less
fair than other legal doctrines. Most legal doctrines decide how much luck to
consider on the basis of policies appropriate to their domains. Strict liability
does the same thing. It just happens that the appropriate amount of luck to
consider in these situations is none whatsoever. The only relevant factor is the
defendant's decision to engage in a potentially hazardous activity. The
contingency that caused the potential hazard to actualize is irrelevant. But in
this world of fortuity, defendants are always held liable for circumstances
beyond their control. Strict liability simply does it more straightforwardly than
most other doctrines. 76 Otherwise, it is no different at all.
There are other doctrines that blatantly punish people for factors beyond
their control and that sometimes arouse a sense of injustice similar to strict
liability. The ancient common-law doctrine that ignorance of the law is no
excuse penalizes people who do not know the current state of the law 77 The
intent is to encourage people to learn and follow the law 78 Yet in the modem
world many laws are not intuitively obvious, and therefore it is difficult for
ordinary citizens to learn them all. If the ignorance is honest, then the result is
simply to punish people for things they did not know and perhaps could not
have known. As Sanford Kadish says, it is "tough luck." 79
The thin-skulled plaintiff doctrine of tort law is another example of the law
disregarding the influence of fortuity. Under the thm-skulled plaintiff doctrine,
defendants are liable for all the harm caused by a tort, even disproportionate
75 See Singer, supra note 67.
76 Tony Honor6 justifies strict liability by ascribing responsibility to all risks and
concluding that being punished purely for bad luck is simply one kind of a risk. Honor6,
supra note 30, at 530. This argument can be seen as a challenge to the traditional excuse of
involuntariness. The challenge succeeds only if risk is resolved into two components: First,
people risk having bad luck. Second, people risk that the luck will be of a kind that the law
does not excuse. Tins refinement helps Honor6 to explain bad luck for which people are not
held liable, for instance, harm which they are judged not to have proximately caused. Yet
the puzzle of the second step remains: What mechanisms does the law use to convey when
luck is excused and when luck is not excused?
77 See, e.g., People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987). The Model Penal
Code preserves the doctrine unless the nistake negates the requisite nens rea. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.04 (1985).
78 Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1069 (citing HOLMES, supra note 57, at 48).
79 KADISH, supra note 61, at 90. Recall that Aristotle considered ignorance an
excusing condition. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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and unforeseeable harm to an unusually fragile plaintiff.80 The underlying
policies are burden-shifting and ease of administration.81 These policies are
reasonable from society's point of view, but from the defendant's point of view
the result may seem entirely arbitrary. The tort feasor of a thin-skulled plaintiff
may feel that liability has materialized from nowhere: One minute he was
playfully kicking a classmate m the leg, the next minute he was indebted for the
loss of a limb.82 The pre-existing malady is a matter of chance, uncaused by
the tortfeasor. Yet the tortfeasor becomes liable for it.83
The common theme among these situations is defendants being held liable
for circumstances beyond their control: defective subsoil, legal decisions, or
pre-existing maladies. This may seem harsh, but seemingly milder doctrines
like proximate cause have the same effect. The law must continually exclude
luck, and some doctrines do it more explicitly than others. Doctrines like
proximate cause shift attention away from the fortuities that underlie the cause,
while doctrines like strict liability simply impose liability up front. But in all
cases, a line must be drawn. Legal needs and public policy motivate decisions
about how to deal with the problem of luck.
C. Method Three: Not Holding People Responsible for Luck
The final method is simply not to hold people liable for luck. This is the
default option: If liability is not imposed by concealing luck or overriding it,
then liability is not imposed at all. This approach appears fair because fortune
itself is beyond criticism and control. The law abides by its premise by
absolving defendants of liability for circumstances beyond their control, even
though the plaintiff often suffers tragic (i.e., unfortunate) results.
An obvious instance of this approach is the treatment of accidents in tort
law. Nobody is liable for an injury that "was not intended and which, under all
the circumstances, could not have been foreseen or prevented by the exercise of
reasonable precautions." 8 4 To hold somebody liable for harm done by a bolt of
8 0 KEETON Er AL., supra note 35, § 9, at 39-40.
81 ld. at 40. "[1It is better for unexpected losses to fall upon the intentional wrongdoer
than upon the innocent victim." Id.82 Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891).
83 The criminal analogue to the thm-skulled plaintiff is a victim who dies when the
defendant intended only to wound. In this case, the law holds the defendant liable for the
fortuitous result. The converse occurs when the defendant intended to kill but the victim is
merely wounded. In this case the defendant is held liable only for the actual result, even
though its occurrence was fortuitous. Here the law accepts the consequence of fortuity and
does not impose liability beyond the (so-called) nonfortuitous harm.8 4 KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 29, at 162; see also HOLMES, supra note 57, at 94
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lightning or a surprise flood seems unfair and has no deterrent value.85 Thus,
when the law decides to follow the third option, there is no liability for luck
that is explicitly recognized as such.86
The language used to describe the situations indicates the choice of this
approach. The very term "accident" suggests luck, and the old term "act of
God" removed the cause of harm as far from human agency as it could
possibly go. The role of chance in strict liability is understood but rarely
mentioned explicitly. Courts speak instead of assumed risks or hazardous
activities. When courts want to take advantage of the popular tendency to
equate fortuity with nonliability, they begin to speak m the language of luck.
In general, legal excuses conform to this approach. In criminal law, for
instance, mistakes of fact can be exculpatory.8 7 A mistake is a defense to a
crime in which defendants act reasonably, but due to circumstances beyond
their knowledge or control, something occurs that otherwise would be
criminally sanctionable. For example, a defendant would not be liable for
shooting somebody who was sitting behind a target at a firing range. 88 The
defendant behaved reasonably, and the victim's presence was literally
unfortunate. Similarly, in contract law, developments that the defendant cannot
control may relieve responsibility for breach of contract.8 9 In these cases, the
legal outcome accords neatly with a popular sense of justice.
Yet all luck obviously cannot be excused. To excuse all luck would put the
law in the absurd position of never holding anybody responsible for anything.
Thus, the law must carefully choose when it will employ the third option.
Generally it is limited to situations that are both flagrantly accidental and
(stating "that loss from accident must lie where it falls...").
85 Snyder v. Farmers Irrigation Dist., 61 N.W.2d 557 (Neb. 1953) (flood); Sauer v.
Rural Co-op. Power Ass'n, 31 N.W.2d 15 (Minn. 1948) (ightning).
86 However, courts may still manage to find cause and not recognize the presence of
luck. One court, for example, found that a worker's injunes were caused by is work-not
an act of God-when he was struck by lightning while working in a coal mine more than
one hundred feet underground. Stout v. Elkhorn Co., 160 S.W.2d. 31 (Ky. Ct. App. 1942).
Subterranean settling caused by the mining created a crack in the earth's crust that allowed
electricity to reach the miner when lightening struck an oak tree on the surface. Obviously,
the court was motivated by compensation and burden shifting. But to justify its decision, the
court had to portray the incident as causal rather than freakish.
87 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04.
88 KADISH, supra note 61, at 84.
89 ARTHUR L. CORBI, CORBIN ON CoNmAcrs (one volume ed.) § 1321, at 1090
(1952). Corbin cites to a famous case mn which a defendant was not held liable for breaching
a contract to deliver a music hall because the hall was destroyed before the scheduled
delivery. Id. § 1321, at 1090 n.3 (citing Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.
1863)).
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contain no overriding policy reason to impose liability.
To summarize, the law cannot and does not excuse all fortuity. Some
chance outcomes are excused (method three); some fortuity straightforwardly
leads to liability (method two); some fortuity is submerged or labeled as
causation or intent, and then liability is imposed (method one). Decisions about
how and when fortuity is treated are made on the grounds appropriate to the
situation. There is a constant process of line drawing in order to determine how
much luck to recognize and how to handle it. The overarching concern is to
maintain the appearance of fairness and the coherence of the institution of
blaming. Often this is done by artfully manipulating the premise that people are
not responsible for luck by selectively recognizing the presence of chance.
III. CONCLUSION
Many authors-whether in law, philosophy, economics, or whatever-
devote attention to the discussion of chance. But very few authors treat chance
as a topic of its own or try to integrate the attention it receives m the many
fields individually. It seems strange that a topic relevant to so many diverse
disciplines, and so important to people's lives, is not given more attention in its
own right. I have attempted in this essay to bring chance to the forefront of
discussion-to make it a heading of its own rather than a subheading within
some other subject. By doing so, I have tried to move beyond the
contemporary debate between foundationalist and relativistic ethics. I have
stepped firmly into a relativistic viewpoint in order to demonstrate what the
world looks like from that perspective. These steps are necessary to show what
is at stake in the debate.
The issue I highlighted is consistency. With a relativistic viewpoint comes
a commitment to chance at extraordinarily deep levels. Yet responsibility, as
we understand it, is linked to control because people are not considered
responsible when they are not in control. These two theses are incompatible
with each other. The solution, however, is not to abandon or modify one thesis
or the other, but to keep each of them and use them inconsistently. This
inconsistency is not a lie, but an essential part of human understanding. A little
bit of blindness is a healthy thing. To document this idea I have examined one
type of inconsistency in detail. Hopefully this will open the door to future
discussions of the same kind and lead to a more detailed and informed
understanding of the concept of responsibility that undergirds the entire legal
system.
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